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The telephone rings. It is the new minister of labor of the former Communist 
state of  ~  . “Professor, my first day in office and I’m at a loss. Prices are 
rising.  Unemployment is growing by  leaps and bounds.  Output in the  state 
sector dropped 20 percent. The finance minister says the budget hasn’t a cent 
for workers. What can I do?’ 
The labor difficulties in the marketizing economies of  Eastern Europe exceed 
those of  competitive economies with stable labor institutions. Governments, 
ministers, laws, countries, change. Independent unions compete with succes- 
sors to the old official unions to represent workers. The nomenklatura spin off 
profitable  segments of  state-owned enterprises. Managers with  little knowl- 
edge of  market economics  struggle to run  large state enterprises. Bankrupt 
state-owned firms seek government bailouts. Private firms develop their own 
employment relations. Westerners buy enterprises and introduce their nation’s 
labor practices. Workers’ councils pressure managers on wages and employ- 
ment. Help! 
When I told my colleague John Dunlop that I had agreed to analyze labor 
relations in the marketizing economies of Eastern Europe for this conference, 
he thought that I was mad: “It’s chaos, young man. Any sane person would 
wait until the dust has settled. Then maybe you will have something sensible 
to say.” Mad or not, I try in this paper to determine how labor relations and 
wage setting proceeded  in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia during the 
The observations that served as a basis for this study are derived from discussions with trade 
union and government officials and researchers in the various countries. In addition, the author 
benefited from the research assistance of Peter Orszag, from discussions with Mark Schaffer, Hart- 
mut Lehmann, and Saul Estrin of the London School of  Economics Centre for Economic Perfor- 
mance, and from written comments by  David  Laibson of  the Massachusetts Institute of Tech- 
nology. 
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initial phase of the transition to a market economy and to develop a framework 
for assessing how labor arrangements might affect that transition. 
Section 8.1 reports surprising inertia in labor institutions despite new labor 
laws in all three countries. During the period under study, the successors to the 
old official unions remained in place at most workplaces; central authorities 
regulated wage setting through taxes on wage increases and minimum wages; 
tripartite bodies discussed labor issues but did not bargain over wages or other 
outcomes. Section 8.2 tells a different story about wages and employment. It 
shows sizable reductions in employment in state-run enterprises that mark a 
sharp break  with  behavior  under  “reform  socialism”  (Kornai  1986; World 
Bank 1987, 1990b). It also reports increased private-sector employment, wid- 
ening industrial wage structures in Hungary and Poland, increasing differen- 
tials between managers and other workers, and falls in real wages and increas- 
ing unemployment.  Section  8.3 assesses  the  effect  of  labor  institutions on 
worker tolerance for the costs of reforms, on the ability of workers who lose 
in transition to conduct mass protests, and on whether the institutions provide 
“voice” feedbacks that may improve programs. 
8.1  What’s Happening to Labor Relations? 
The starting points for the marketizing countries are the labor relations insti- 
tutions of Communist dictatorships. Communist labor relations policies con- 
tributed greatly to the failure of their economies. They produced excess de- 
mand for labor, poor work effort, and distorted wage structures-all  of which 
contributed to economic  inefficiency. In  addition,  Communist  governments 
sought to restrict labor mobility and occupational choice and enrolled all work- 
ers in official Communist unions that were “transmission belts” for authorities 
rather than the voice of the workers. 
On the demand side, state enterprises hired labor to meet output norms sub- 
ject to centrally determined “soft” budget constraints. In extreme form, de- 
mand for labor evinced “a tendency to grow without limits” (Kornai  1982, 
27-28).  Job vacancies were immense and responded perversely to economic 
changes. In Poland in the mid-l980s, for instance, vacancies rose as output fell 
(Freeman  1987)-presumably  because  enterprises  cared  little  about  labor 
costs in their desire to meet output goals. Indicative of this “noneconomic be- 
havior,” Lehmann and Schaffer (1992) report sizable gaps between estimated 
marginal productivity and wages in Polish enterprises in 1983-88  and find no 
evidence that firms expanded employment to close the gaps. Shortages of in- 
puts and consumer goods also impaired labor market efficiency. Material short- 
ages made it rational to hoard labor so that workers would be available when 
materials arrived. Shortages of consumer goods made nonmonetary remunera- 
tion, such as housing allotments or health care provided by the enterprise, criti- 
cal in compensation, devaluing wages as a price and limiting the scope of labor 
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domestic market in Poland were supplied by allotment rather than sales (World 
Bank 1990b, 44). The individuals who received the allotments made roughly 
four years’ pay at the free market resale value of the car (p. 4.3,  while the 
producers had no price incentive to produce more cars. 
On the supply side, the state made open unemployment illegal (in  1985, 
7,000 people in Hungary served a prison sentence for idleness), tolerated poor 
performance by the employed, forbade those with entrepreneurial skills from 
establishing firms beyond a minimal size, and often sought to limit labor mo- 
bility, although with little apparent success.’ With low pay and a guaranteed 
job, workers often “put in time” in the state sector while devoting themselves 
to second-economy jobs, using state materials or properties for their personal 
economic activities. Hungary’s “work partnerships” meant that many would do 
little during the normal work day but work hard for shares of  profits during 
after-hours production. 
State wage and price  setting compounded inefficiency. Low wages made 
labor “cheap,” contributing to excess demand. Piece-rate systems were often 
“demoralized”:  in the mid- 1980s in Poland, workers overfulfilled norms by 
48-74  percent (Freeman 1987). Many enterprises paid workers largely with 
add-ons that made base rates a small component of pay and created significant 
divergences between wages and labor costs. In 1986, Polish coal miners re- 
ceived just one-quarter of their monthly remuneration through base pay. Wage 
differentials between nonmanual and manual workers were excessively narrow. 
In  1980, the relative earnings of nonmanual to manual workers was  1.05 in 
Poland and 1.13 in Hungary, compared to 1.44 in four West European coun- 
tries (in 1978) (Redor 1986, 5). Differentials by industry were also narrow by 
world standards, save for favored heavy industries such as mining (Sziraczki 
1990, table 6). At the same time, bureaucratic distribution of the right to pur- 
chase shortage goods produced a rationing system with great inequality. 
Finally, the state suppressed independent trade unions, forcing workers into 
official “transmission belt” unions whose purpose was to carry out orders from 
the center. Unions owned considerable property (the Hungarian union Bala- 
tonfured facilities shocked ILO visitors in 1984) and allocated subsidized va- 
cations, pensions, and the like. The Party often placed its worst hacks in union 
jobs. Excess demand for labor and material shortages may have given local 
work groups “everyday power” to bargain with management (Kollo 1988) and 
allowed individuals to shift jobs despite legal sanctions, but overall the system 
made the most debilitating form of exit-halfhearted  work effort-the  main 
way  of  expressing  discontent and ruled  out productive  “voice” methods of 
challenging workplace or national economic decisions. 
In the 1970s and  1980s, nearly all Communist states attempted to reform 
this system, decentralizing some decisions and freeing some prices. However, 
1. In some Communist countries, state restrictions on labor supply were more severe.  The Soviet 
Union required permits to live in cities. China allocated school leavers to work sites. 4  Richard B. Freeman 
in Eastern and Central Europe, these efforts failed (Kornai 1986; World Bank 
1987, 1990a, 1990b; Sziracki 1990),  just as did the longer-standing Yugoslav 
experiment with market-oriented worker management (Estrin 199  1). Some re- 
forms may have been misguided. Others were halfhearted. Poland freed many 
prices in the mid-1980s but failed to curb the power of branch ministries and 
enacted a workers’ council law that nominally accorded great power to workers 
at the plant level but suppressed SolidarnoSC. And so on. The ultimate cause of 
the failure of the reforms was not, however, their specifics but rather continued 
nomenklatura control of key decisions. When I visited Polish plants in  1986, 
managers  shrugged  at questions about the new  reforms;  they  still relied on 
ministries to guide decisions, obtain supplies, and so on. Hungary’s 1980s ef- 
fort to engage labor in the productive process through enterprise councils failed 
to attract ordinary  workers:  70 percent  of participants  in the councils  were 
members of the Communist party. In Czechoslovakia, “by far the biggest ob- 
stacle for undertaking  fundamental  reform . . . was  the almost total  lack of 
interest of the labor force. . . alienated from the political leadership . . . [while] 
enterprise management, which had learned to manipulate the existing system 
to its own advantage, formed a powerful coalition of resistance” (World Bank 
1990a, 40). Not until the late 1980s democratic revolutions was it possible to 
replace political domination of the economy with markets. With formal state 
controls lifted and the informal nomenklatura controls greatly weakened, man- 
agement had to listen to a new drummer-the  economic marketplace. 
How far have Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia moved from the Com- 
munist labor relations system by  1991-92?  Which aspects of  the Communist 
system have been replaced by more market-based practices, and which aspects 
persist, possibly slowing economic reforms? 
8.1.1  Labor Laws 
At the outset of the transition period, all three countries changed the rules 
governing labor in ways that brought them in line with Western practices (see 
table 8.1). They eliminated restrictions on labor supply, allowed freedom of 
association, accorded collective bargaining wide nominal scope in determining 
wages and rules of work (but in fact used taxes on increases beyond centrally 
determined  rates to restrict wages in state-owned enterprises),  gave workers 
rights to strike, replaced the guarantee (requirement) of  work with unemploy- 
ment insurance benefits, and introduced personal income taxes. In Czechoslo- 
vakia, the law on employment  stipulates that employers inform trade unions 
and local employment offices about job vacancies and intended dismissals but 
gives employers full rights to hire and fire. In Poland, the obligation  to list 
vacancies with state offices was abolished, then reinstated as unemployment 
rose. Each country devoted limited resources to active labor market policies. 
Despite the general similarity of the new market-oriented labor legislation, 
there are differences in the laws that foretell different labor relations systems 
in the future. Czechoslovak law forbids lower-level bodies from bargaining for 5  What Direction for Labor Market Institutions? 
Table 8.1  Changes in Labor Laws in Transition 
A. Hungary 
April  1989 Right to Strike Guaranteed 
Extensive conciliation and mediation: 7-day conciliation period; allow 2-hour warning strike; 
if identity of employer cannot be determined, Council of Ministers shall appoint representative; 
no coercive measures to terminate employment; workers participating in lawful strike shall be 
entitled to all rights, save for wages or benefits; cannot strike if court has jurisdiction over issue 
or during agreement; safety or security of essential importance 
Act II of  1989 on Right of  Association 
SZOT 
Employment Act (IV)  of  1991 
fund active manpower policies to be determined by triparite bodies 
1991 Acts on Financing 
11 July, on the Check-off System: workers to give written declaration to check off dues to 
union 
12 July, on Trade Union Property and Equality of Opportunity in Workers’s Organizing: 
requires unions to account for asset, with total to be distributed among unions by four-union 
group (LICA, workers’ councils, MSZOSZ, and one other) in proportion to support in election 
Questions regarding employment shall be regulated by collective agreements, but set up for 
Establishes principles for collective bargaining; unemployment insurance from Solidarity 
B. Poland 
Law on Unionization 
government and SolidarnoSL 
Employment Law of  March 1991 
Provisions on dismissals, retraining, severance pay after 4 years of service; nominally gives 
unemployment benefits of  70% of pay for first 3 months of eligibility; 50% for next 6 months; 
40% thereafter, but in fact limited to one-third of forecasted average pay (minimum wage) 
Trade Union Act of 23 May 1991 
to be heard by Sejm; responsible for health and safety laws; cannot divide income among 
members; role in socialhousing funds; employer must provide information on wage, 
employment issues; premises and equipment for union activity; released time; compulsory 
mediation before strike; 14 days after dispute; can choose to go to social arbitration committee 
of court; chap. 4, art. 17.4: “When taking the strike decision, the union should ensure that 
demands are proportional to the losses connected with the strike”; majority vote if 50% vote; 5 
days advance; 2-hour warning strike; participation is voluntary; employees retain rights during 
strike 
April 1989: very similar to October 1982 law, which has been passed as compromise between 
No discrimination against union members; provision for multiple unionism (10 people); right 
C. Czechoslovakia 
Strike Law/Act No. 83, December I990 
association; establishes unions who have to notify Ministry of Interior; illegal to give wages 
above those agreed by higher level-outlaws  wage drift (sec. 4.2.c) 
Collective Bargaining Act 1990 Decembel; No. 2 of  February 1991 
Ministry of Labour and Welfare can extend contracts; Section 7; 1  -year disputes-mediator 
required with shared costs; then arbitrator; 50% of labor force (not just those who vote) needed 
Amended labor code-Act  on Association of Citizens abolished all restrictions on freedom of 6  Richard B. Freeman 
Table 8.1  (continued) 
C. Czechoslovakia 
for strike; 3 days notice; essential services; no coercion; viewed as authorized leave of  absence; 
mentions lockout 
Employment Act of  4 December 1990/Effective as of  February 1991 
drops to 50% of net monthly income on hasis of past job for those who work 1 year; 1 year max; 
3-month advance notice on layoffs 
Right to employment; employment services; unemployment benefits for job seeker, 60%, 
Source: ILO (1990a, 1990h, 1991a, 1991h); “The Trade Union Act” (1991); Rynek Pracy (Minis- 
try of Labour and Social Policy of Poland), no. 1 (January 1992). 
wages in excess of those agreed on at a higher level, ruling out negotiated wage 
drift, and allows the Ministry of  Labor to extend contracts to enterprises not 
covered in bargaining. These provisions set the stage for genuine centralized 
bargaining. The 1982 Polish workers’ councils law gave considerable power 
to workers at the enterprise level, including the right to hire and fire managers, 
creating something akin to genuine worker-managed firms (Schaffer 199  1). 
This has affected privatization (Federowicz and Levitas 1994), with the state 
forced to “buy off” the workers’ councils by  giving them seats on boards of 
directors and discounted shares as part of privatization. The Hungarian Com- 
munist regime gave unions veto rights over activities that contravene legal reg- 
ulations or  “offend socialist morality” (a power invoked in  some  100-200 
cases from 1980-87  [Hethy 1991,65]), which has the potential of augmenting 
union power in the future along German workers’ council lines, but which has 
had littie effect on practices during the transition. 
8.1.2  Rates of Unionization 
While union-reported membership figures in the marketizing economies are 
undoubtedly exaggerations owing to the rivalry between old and new unions,2 
and while there are always problems interpreting membership data in different 
countries, the available information supports two observations. 
First, union densities have fallen from the artificially high levels under com- 
munism. This is to be expected since Communist unions were more akin to 
government agencies than workers’ organizations. Indeed, one could view den- 
sities under the Communist dictatorships as zero (save for Solidarnos’i) and 
read the recent statistics as the growth of true unionism. The union-based fig- 
ures in table 8.2 suggest densities that have plummeted to perhaps 35-50  per- 
cent in some of the countries as of late 1991. Membership is almost exclusively 
in state-owned enterprises, in their immediate successor enterprises, or among 
2. The figures include pensioners, need not refer to dues-paying members in a given time period, 
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Table 8.2  Trade Unions in the Eastern Bloc (density or membership in 
parentheses) 
Takeover of Old OfJicial  Unions 
DGB unions 
East Germany. Subsumed into West German DGB; many workers join IG Metall and other 
Czechoslovakia (70% density). CS KOS formed in March 1991 as strike committees replace 
union; one-third of old officials reelected, but complete change at top; receive all property, but 
“cannot find its place in new market economy” (5,000,000) 
Confederation of Cultural Workers-intellectuals  (300,000) 
Dual Union Structure 
Poland (35%). OPZZ (4,500,000, including pensioners)-successor  to Communists; 
opportunistic, allied with Communist party; branch structure; strong among professionals 
(associations);  still controls all union properties 
Solidamosc (2,000,000)-pro-market  reform; related to government; elected to Sejm; 
regional structure with rivalries 
Some unaligned unions-miners  and local strike groups 
Bulgaria (45%). Confederation of Independent Bulgarian Trade Unions (Association) 
Podkrepa (250,000)-pro-market  reform; for big bang 
Edintstvo-early  1991 (250,000) 
Hungary (60%) (September 1991). MSZOSZ-old  official union SZOT declared 
Breakaways from SZOT Association for Intellectuals (90,000); Solidarity Association 
Independent unions: LIGA-major  opposition, aligned with Free Democrats; based on 
(1,800,000)-reformed  traditional unions 
Multiple Unionism 
independence 1988; dissolves 1990 (2,000,000) 
(150,000); Autonomous (350,000); Forum (750,000) 
intellectuals (250,000); workers’ councils-aligned  with LIGA (45,000) 
Communists (2,500,000) 
(1,100,000); Hercules (300,000); Conosenerz (100,000) 
Rumania (65%). CNSLR (National Confederation of Free Trade Unions)-successor  to 
Breakways from old Communist: Aliate (1,000,000); Cartel-Alpha (1,300,000); Neafiliate 
Independent unions: FRATIA-drivers;  oil; teachers; scientists (500,000) 
Russia (loo%?). Independent unions: miners union; air traffic controllers; pilots federation; 
SUTSPROF-largely  intellectuals’ unions; Confederation of Labor-social  and political 
movement; strike committees 
Successor unions: GCTU-  1989 declares independence; Russian branch becomes Federation 
of Independent Unions of Russia (FNPR); United Front of Working People-conservative  union 
groups; Workers Unions in Moscow 
Source: Hungary: HUG, 14 September 1991,6; Reti (1991); Jones (1992); Gordon (1992b). 
pensioners. For Hungary, household data from the International Social Sur- 
vey  Programme survey show a unionization rate on the order of 40-50  per- 
cent (Blanchflower and Freeman 1992), suggesting a greater fall in member- 
ship than indicated in the union-based numbers. For Poland, Federowicz and 
Levitas estimate that “in a typical firm 20-35%  of  workers joined Solidarity 
and 20-35%  remained in OPZZ” (1994, 32), which suggests that, excluding 
pensioners, SolidarnoG may have similar membership to OPZZ. 8  Richard B. Freeman 
The second and more surprising observation is the continued viability of the 
“successor unions”  to the old  official  unions.  Despite  their checkered past, 
these unions remain the largest worker organizations. In table 8.2, I have cate- 
gorized the trade union structure in the countries into three groups. The first is 
a “takeover pattern” in which the old unions were taken over by new leaders, 
as in Czechoslovakia, or where union members were absorbed into Western 
unions, as in East Germany. IG Metall initially intended to merge with the East 
German metalworkers’ union but found that its East German pair was in fact 
a subordinate  organization  to the  central Communist federation,  with  little 
real presence at workplaces. Instead, TG  Metall enrolled 900,000 East German 
metalworkers  (MacShane 1992). My second category is one of “dual  union 
structures” where the successor unions compete with sizable free union con- 
federations. It is found in Poland, Bulgaria, Albania, and Slovenia. My third 
grouping is one of multiple unionism, in which democratization  has brought 
with it not only new  independent  unions  but  also breakaways  from the old 
official  confederation.  Hungary  and  Romania  are the  prime examples, al- 
though  Russia  may also fall  into this case, as successors to the old unions 
fragment. 
Why, given freedom of association and the existence  of new independent 
alternatives,  have  workers  not  “tossed  out the  scoundrels”  or switched en 
masse to the newly formed democratic unions? Why have successor unions 
remained part of the new economic reality? Three factors appear to account 
for the persistence of  the successor unions: the resources of  incumbency; the 
weakness of new unions; and the ambivalence of the new governments toward 
reforming labor relations. 
With  respect  to  incumbency,  the  successor  unions  own  substantial  prop- 
erty-vacation  and  holiday  facilities,  buildings,  newspapers,  and so  on- 
amassed under the Communist dictatorship;  in many cases they continue to 
manage social fund expenditures in enterprises. They have experienced repre- 
sentatives in workplaces and large full-time staffs to communicate and orga- 
nize activities. In Hungary, the successor unions often maintain close ties with 
management  (managers were members  of the union until  1990), which dis- 
courages the formation of rivals. The monthly LIGA News, put out by the new 
independent  union  movement from its offices  in Budapest, reports cases of 
firings for new union activity in every edition. In Poland, the local leadership 
of OPZZ is in many cases made up of management. 
The continued control by successor unions of  assets obtained by taxing all 
workers is a major bone of contention. In Poland, OPZZ used financial chica- 
nery to minimize the possibility that resources seized during martial law from 
SolidarnoSC will be returned to that organization. In Hungary, the state enacted 
laws in July 199  1 to prevent MSZOZ from dispersing union assets in ways that 
would allow the old Communist bureaucracy to maintain control of them. The 
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union property and assets of  the former Communist unions  one of  its three 
main declarations. 
Incumbency  advantages notwithstanding,  had  successor unions  remained 
transmission  belts  of  the  state, their credibility among workers would  have 
been zilch, and they would probably have collapsed. But, save in Czechoslova- 
kia and East Germany, the official unions distanced themselves from the state 
in the closing days of  Communist rule, if  not earlier, as their leadership and 
the Communist party recognized that some autonomy was necessary for their 
operation. In Poland, OPZZ took a relatively independent stance after martial 
law, and many Poles came to view it as a genuine union  rather than part of 
Communist repression. The SolidarnoSC leadership has very negative views of 
its rival, but at lower levels OPZZ and SolidarnoSC unionists often cooperate 
on workers’ councils or in other labor activity (Dabrowski, Federowicz, and 
Levitas 1992). In Hungary, the old official unions protected workers at some 
workplaces and represented their interests in various forums (Noti 1987). “On 
several occasions branch unions were able to achieve far higher wage increases 
than originally planned by the government” (Kollo 1988, 27), often with the 
support of ministers whose incentive was to meet target outputs rather than to 
fight wage increases. In Russia, the official union declared itself independent 
of the Communist state in 1989 and led protests against the price increases of 
Yeltsin’s  reforms; as of  this  writing,  it  exists  in the form of  a federation of 
“independent” Russian unions. 
There is often a sharp division between the position of local unions and the 
successor union central federation. Reformers may run some locals, while the 
central union bureaucracy is dominated by traditional Communist types; or, as 
in Bulgaria, reformers may  control the central  federation, while older-style 
officials  remain  ensconced  in lower-level  union  positions.  Opportunistic  or 
amoral the  leaders of the old unions may  be, but, if  they can run effective 
unions in the new environment, their organizations are likely to remain sig- 
nificant players on the labor scene. 
On the other side, the new unions have weaknesses that limit their growth. 
Except for Solidarnoid,  they are fledgling  organizations with little financial 
resources and tiny professional staffs. LIGA, for instance, was formed in Janu- 
ary  1990 with fourteen affiliates and 30,000 members. In the fall of  1991, it 
had just eight full-time staffers. Most of the new unions were initiated by medi- 
cal, scientific, or artistic personnel (LIGA was founded by sociologists) and 
are dominated by intellectuals who may have difficulty relating to blue-collar 
workers. This contrasts with Germany after World War 11, where experienced 
union leaders from the pretotalitarian period emerged to lead successor organi- 
zations to those banned under the Nazis. SolidarnoSC, which has a longer orga- 
nizational history, has a different problem: to transform itself from a national 
social movement with a regional structure (whose former head is president of 
the country) to a genuine trade union. Still, these unions often have consider- 10  Richard B. Freeman 
able prestige in their countries and an influence that exceeds membership. In 
Russia, experts view their influence as being similar to that of the nominally 
much larger successor unions (Gordon 1992b). 
The most serious problem the new unions face is developing an agenda and 
a message to attract workers in a period of massive economic restructuring. 
SolidamoSC and LIGA are liberal pro-market organizations that forthrightly 
recognize the costs of  transition. Despite the potential for increasing union 
power, LIGA opposed eliminating taxes on wage increases in Hungary for fear 
it would create inflationary wage pressures (LIGA News, 1991, no. 2);  Solidar- 
noSC,  by contrast, has opposed Poland’s taxes on wage increases (Solidarnok 
News, June 1991). SolidamoSC’s link to the Walesa government has meant that 
some workers feel that they may be better represented by OPZZ, which has the 
option for demagoguery. Honesty about a depressing economic reality during 
transition is not a rallying cry for attracting workers to pro-reform unions. 
Finally, governments have been slow to challenge the legitimacy of  the old 
official unions. As of this writing, only Hungary has tried to reduce the succes- 
sor unions’  advantage of  incumbency and to level the playing field for new 
unions. In July 1991, it passed legislation that required workers to sign a writ- 
ten declaration permitting dues checkoff, which had been automatically de- 
ducted and sent to the old official unions under legislation that the Communists 
introduced in 1988 to buttress those organizations. Given a choice between no 
union and a union that could affect their lives at workplaces, many workers 
chose to support MSZOZ, giving them a legitimacy they had lacked. A second 
law enacted in July 1991 set up an October 1992 election to divide the assets 
of all unions in proportion to their support among workers. The independent 
unions did reasonably well in this election. 
Why  have  the  new  governments  not  tried  to disestablish  the  traditional 
unions? One reason is to avoid state interference with union activity that would 
be mindful of Communist interventions. Another is that the governments’ first 
concern is macrostabilization and privatization. Labor relations is a backburner 
issue, which governments  would  prefer to avoid for fear of  precipitating  a 
mare’s nest of union rivalry and instability. Finally, some officials may prefer 
dealing with old unions with a history of  subservience to the state and ques- 
tionable legitimacy than  with new  representative  bodies that could  aggres- 
sively oppose stabilization programs. Some undoubtedly hope that unions will 
wither away. Given the need to enlist worker support for reforms and the poten- 
tial contribution of  unions to marketization, this is a shortsighted and risky 
strategy (see sec. 8.3 below). 
8.1.3  Wage-Setting Institutions and Tripartite Organizations 
Whereas marketizing economies have moved rapidly  to market pricing of 
goods, they have maintained control of  wages in the state-owned  sector by 
levying high taxes on wage increases above a given  level and by  imposing 
minimum wage laws. In both areas, their policies mimic those of their Commu- 11  What Direction for Labor Market Institutions? 
nist  predecessor  regimes.  Reform  Communist  governments  typically  taxed 
changes in wages funds (=  employment X wage) to discourage enterprises 
from raising wages. The policy innovation of the new regimes is to tax changes 
in average wages above a norm rate of  increase dependent on expected infla- 
tion. The rules for taxing wage increases and for allowing catch-up when infla- 
tion exceeds expectations differ across the countries, as summarized in table 
8.3, part A. In Hungary, enterprises with rapid increases in value added are 
allowed greater increases in wages before being taxed; in Czechoslovakia, the 
Ministry of  Labor claims that taxes will be applied to wages funds (Riveros 
1991, 11). Hungary and Czechoslovakia exclude from the taxes small state- 
owned enterprises, and all three countries exclude foreign-owned or private 
firms. Since large state enterprises employ the bulk of the work force, the taxa- 
tion of wage increases in the state sector should determine the economy-wide 
level of  increases from which private enterprises can be expected to deviate 
only m~derately.~ 
The taxes on wage increases have not, however, controlled wage inflation. 
In Poland, wage increases fell short of the norms in the first half of  1990 and 
then  rose  to make up the deficit by  the end of the  year, when hundreds  of 
enterprises paid the popyvek tax for increasing wages faster than the norm. In 
1991, average  wages  exceeded  the  wage  norm  by  a  considerable  margin 
(Schaffer  1992, 24), making the popyvek a major contributor to state budget 
revenue. In Hungary, the norm rate of increase in wages for 1990 was 14 per- 
cent (positing an inflation rate of 18 percent), whereas wages rose by  24 per- 
cent with an inflation rate of 29 percent. In Czechoslovakia, wages increased 
by less than the permitted rate in the first quarter of  1991 (Nesporova  1991, 
18). That wage  increases  did  not follow the tax-based  norms does not,  of 
course, mean that the policy was ineffective, but it does show that factors be- 
yond the tax-based policy also affect wages.4 In Poland, the limited increases 
in the first half of 1990 are ascribed to fears that wage increases might cause 
bankruptcies and loss of jobs, while the ensuing wage increases in the latter 
half of the year are attributed to a preelection weakening of government budget 
 constraint^.^ Schaffer (1992) links the slackening of wage pressures in Poland 
in  1991 to the collapse of  enterprise profits and the sharp drop in output (to 
which I would add rising unemployment) rather than to the popyvek per se. 
3. At General Electric’s Tungsram operation in Budapest, in the fall of 1991 wages were just 13 
percent above those in the overall economy. The economy-wide minimum was Ft 7,000; the mini- 
mum  at  Tungsram was  Ft  7,900;  pay  averaged Ft  14,000 in  the economy  and Ft  15,800 at 
Tungsram. 
4. Absent a clear counterfactual, it is not easy to tell the effect of an incomes policy on wage 
setting. A spike in wage increases at the point where the tax “kicks in” may reflect its use as a 
norm for wage setting rather than the effect of the tax per se, perhaps causing enterprises that 
would have given smaller increases to give the norm increase. Increases greater than the norm may 
still be less than they would otherwise have been. 
5.  Calvo and Coricelli argue that the increase in wages was because firms realized that all enter- 
prises were facing similar financial problems and thus that “policy-makers should try to devise 
ways to make the wage targets stick other than through sustained tight credit policy” (1992,47). 12  Richard B. Freeman 
What might happen if the taxes were eliminated and market and collective 
bargaining  forces  allowed  free sway in  wage  determination  in  state enter- 
prises? High unemployment in all three countries, continued central govern- 
ment influence on enterprise behavior, and harder budget constraints than in 
the past suggest that, even absent taxes on wage increases, wage inflation will 
be moderate. In January  1992, Hungary eliminated the tax on wage increases, 
providing a good test of  this argument. With workers’  councils having great 
power at many plants, Poland presumably would risk the most wage inflation 
by removing its tax, although the danger of job loss, uncertainty about future 
employment opportunities, and limited profits should still deter excessive wage 
increases. In  1992, it too began to consider elimination  of the tax on wage 
increases.  My  assessment  is  that  elimination  will  not  produce  massive 
wage-push inflation. If workers think that wage restraint will give their enter- 
prise a possible future in a market economy, they should be relatively moderate 
in their wage demands, given poor outside economic opportunities.  Only in 
enterprises  where  workers  see no future will  they  be tempted  to engage in 
endgame bargaining by putting all available funds into wages. 
All three countries buttress the lower part of the wage distribution through 
minimum wage legislation. As can be seen in table 8.3, part B, the minimum 
is sufficiently  high in Czechoslovakia  and Hungary to have some “bite” on 
employment but is quite modest relative to average wages in Poland. The mini- 
mum in Czechoslovakia is indexed to rise with inflation greater than 5 percent 
(Riveros 1991, 12), but this appears not to have been implemented (Nesporova 
1991, 18). The 1991 increase in the minimum raised the wages of 22 percent 
of the Hungarian work force (Lado, Szalai, and Sziraczki 1991, 23). 
Hungary and Czechoslovakia have established tripartite consultative organi- 
zations consisting of union confederations, employer federations, and the gov- 
ernment to discuss wage and related labor issues (table 9.3C), including the 
level of  the minimum and taxation of  wage increases.  Such forums existed 
toward the end of the Communist era when official unions met regularly with 
government and management of the state-owned enterprises. In Hungary, the 
new  National  Conciliation  Council  brings together representatives  of  seven 
union confederations (including the successors to the old official unions), em- 
ployer  groups,  and government officials.  In  Czechoslovakia,  labor is repre- 
sented on the tripartite forum by  the leadership of  the successor unions. As 
state-owned  enterprises  dominate the employers’  federations and  decision- 
making power resides with the government, the forums should not be confused 
with West European “social partners” negotiations. Some observers, including 
members  of the forums, dismiss them as pro forma. In Czechoslovakia, the 
unions argued for higher minimum wages at tripartite meetings, but the gov- 
ernment refused their demands. The 1991 General Agreement set measures to 
regulate the growth of wages, inflation adjustments, and the minimum desired 
by the government. In Hungary, employers and unions pushed successfully for 
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Table 8.3  Wage Taxes and Minimum and Average Wages 
A. Tax-Based Incomes Policies 
Poland. Popvvek tax based on wage bill in 1990. then on wages per worker. Penal tax of 
500% of wage increase beyond norm, where the norm is based on expected change in inflation 
of retail prices with a modest indexation coefficient. The difference between expected inflation 
and actual is used to adjust the norm increase in later months. When enterprises give increases 
below the norm in a given period, moveover, they can give larger increases without being taxed 
in the future. Private firms are excluded from the tax 
Hungary. In 1990, 18% increase in wages were tax free; a tax of 43% is applied to wage 
increases between  18% and 28%; wage increases above 28% lead to a tax on the entire 
increment, producing a very steep rising price of wage increases just beyond 38%, which then 
falls as the increases continue since the big extra tax is the addition of the tax on the increment 
There are exceptions for companies whose value added grows at twice the growth of  the wage 
fund; small companies with a wage bill under Ft 20 million; joint ventures where foreigners own 
20% or Ft 5 million of the capital. 
Czechoslovakia. On  I  January 1990, enterprises were given freedom to set wages, but taxes on 
increases according to following schedule: no tax for increases 3% above the agreed norm; tax 
of  KEs 2.00 per korona for increases 3%-5%  above the norm; and tax of KEs 7.5 for increases 
more than 5% above the norm. At roughly average wages this implies that wage increases 
3%-5%  higher than the norm plus the 3% allowable extra increase will cost the firm twice the 
increase while increases over 5% above the norm (plus the 3%  allowable extra increase) will cost 
7.5 times the increase." Does not cover firms with fewer than 25 workers or private-sector firms 
B. Minimum Wage Regulations 
Poland 
Minimum wage (ZI) 
Average wage (ZI) 
Ratio 
Hungary 
Minimum wage (Ft) 
Average wage (Ft) 
Ratio 
% at minimum 
Czechoslovakia 
Minimum wage (KEs) 
Average wage 
Ratio 












C. Tripartite Forums 
Hungary: 1980s, Communist union and stateParty bargain behind closed doors; also establish 
Labour and Wages Council referred to in  1984 ILO report 
1988, open bargaining with SZOT/management with National Council for the Reconciliation 
of Interests 
1990, new government with set of unions under National Conciliation Council-"organ  of 
competence to address issues'' (Hethy 1991, 37); solved taxi drivers' strike; push for local-level 
wage settlements; ending tax on wage increases 
(continued) 14  Richard B. Freeman 
Table 8.3  (continued) 
C. Tripartite Forums 
Czechoslovakia. 1989, state sets up Council of Economic and Social Consensus 
October 1990; Council for Economic and Social Agreement to reach general agreements on 
wages above minimum in law January 1991; 20 employers’ confederations deal with government 
through Coordinating Council of Employers; council has 7 from unions, government, employers; 
to recommend labor market policy and resolve disagreements. 
January 1991, agreement on wage increase far below inflation, sets minimum wages 
Bulgaria. April 1990, National Council for Coordination of Interests 
January 1991, signed agreement 
Poland. 1989, establishes Confederation of Polish Employers; employer organization 
dominated by public-sector employers; Polish Employers’ Confederation-500,000  private 
enterprises supposedly are members, but they employ just 10%  of  workers: 3,000 public but 
90%; limited tripartite because state agency is one of two parties and because SolidarnoSC and 
OPZZ are not friendly. 
Source: Malinowski (1991) Goraet al. (1991), and Nesperova (1991). 
dFor  example, should an employer wish to raise salaries 10% from Kts 3,000 to Kfs 3,300, the 
cost to the employer would be Kts  90 (or KEs 390 total). A further 5% increase to Kts 3540 would 
cost the employer an  additional KEs 300 (or KEs 690 total). And a further 5% increase to KEs 
3690 would  cost the employer Kts 1.125 (or KEs  1,815 total), a cost so high that the raise is 
essentially confiscatory. 
desired. The Conciliation Council also played a role in ending the taxi drivers’ 
strike in  1990. The animus between SolidarnoSC and OPZZ has kept Poland 
from using such tripartite bodies to any extent, although the unions lobby in the 
Sejm in defense of their interests: “Parliament is the only place where NSZZ 
SolidamoG can effectively defend workers’ interests as long as the state re- 
mains the main employer” (SolidurnoiL  News,  September 1991). Many of the 
other marketizing economies have also instituted tripartite forums for discus- 
sion of labor market issues. Absent federations of private employers and union- 
ization of private employers, however, these forums are best viewed as places 
for public-sector workers’ unions to negotiate with the state. 
8.2  What’s Happening in the Labor Market? 
Measuring labor outcomes in the marketizing economies is difficult. Em- 
ployment and wage statistics refer largely to the state-owned sector. Informa- 
tion is sparse on the sizable and growing shadow economies. Unemployment 
figures refer to people who apply for benefits rather than to respondents to a 
labor force  survey. Price  indices  do not  reflect  shortages or the  quality of 
goods. This said, the available data suggest substantial changes in economic 
behavior in the transition: 
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and reduced hiring. Traditional job vacancies have disappeared, replaced by 
joblessness that can bankrupt incipient unemployment benefit systems. 
2. Real earnings and living standards have fallen and the wage structure 
widened in Hungary and Poland but not in Czechoslovakia. Still, opinion poll 
data show that the costs of transition had not seriously taxed the population as 
of late 1991. 
8.2.1  Employment and Vacancies 
Employment in the socialist sector (corrected where possible for changes in 
form of  employment as some enterprises became private) fell sharply in the 
initial phase of transition in all three countries. In Poland, socialized-sector 
‘  employment fell by  15 percent from the first quarter of  1988 to the first quarter 
’ 
of  1991. In  Czechoslovakia, employment dropped by  2.5 percent between 
1989 and  1990, with  the  decline accelerating  toward  the  end  of  the  year 
(fourth-quarter  1990 employment was 5 percent less than fourth-quarter em- 
ployment a year earlier) (Nesporova 1991, 5). In Hungary, employment fell by 
23 percent from the first quarter of 1989 to the first quarter of  1991. By con- 
trast, in each country, private-sector employment rose. In Poland, the share of 
the private sector in nonagricultural employment increased from 16 to 21 per- 
cent between  1989 and 1990 (Berg and Sachs 1992, table 14); in Hungary, it 
grew from 5 percent in 1983 to 11 percent in January 1990 (Lado, Szalai, and 
Sziraczki 1991, 11); in Czechoslovakia, it rose from 3 percent in 1990 to per- 
haps 7 percent in  1991 (Nesperova 1991, 6).  As in the West, most of the fall 
in employment was accomplished through attrition. In Hungary, “enterprise 
managers systematically targeted elderly employees and working pensioners” 
(Lado, Szalai, and Sziraczki 1991, 9). In Poland, just 16 percent of the regis- 
tered unemployed were involved in group layoffs (10 percent or more of  the 
work force, or at least 100 persons, is laid off) in 1990. Information on hiring 
and separation rates in the state-owned sector in Poland shows that the drop in 
hiring was more important than rising separations in the reduction in employ- 
ment of  full-time employees (the figures in the following table are given in 
thousands): 
% Change, 
1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1987-90 
Hiring  2,375  2,255  1,960  1,908  1,453  -  36 
Separations  2,377  2,361  2,178  2,4 17  2,594  10 
Because  the  official  data classify  as separations retail  trade  workers  who 
shifted from cooperative to private employment when their enterprises privat- 
ized, the role of separations is in fact exaggerated in the data. Adjusting for 
the change in classifications suggests that there were 2,195,000 separations in 16  Richard B. Freeman 
1990, a 7 percent decline since 1987, making the fall in hiring the sole cause 
of the 1987-90  reduction in employment.h 
Consistent with this picture of changed state enterprise behavior, the vacanc- 
ies that had characterized Communist economies plummeted while previously 
“nonexistent” unemployment rose. In Poland in 1986, there were over a quarter 
of  a million vacancies; in 1991, there were just 40,000-50,000.  In Hungary, 
there were over 75,000 vacancies in the second quarter of  1986; in early 1991, 
13,000. The ratio of unemployment to vacancies rose almost exponentially. By 
mid-1991, the ratio of  unemployment to vacancies was nearly six to one in 
Czechoslovakia, eleven to one in Hungary, and thirty-three to one in Poland. 
8.2.2  Relative Wages 
Given  the  narrow  wage  distributions  under  communism,  marketization 
should widen wage structures. There is evidence of widening in  state-owned 
manufacturing in Poland and Hungary but not in Czechoslovakia (table 8.4) 
and evidence of rising skill differentials along various dimensions in Hungary. 
In Poland, the widening of  the interindustry wage structure roughly coin- 
cided with the change in regime at the end of the 1980s and was accompanied 
by  rising dispersion  of  wages across firms related  to profitability. In  1989, 
wages were essentially unrelated to enterprise profitability, whereas, in  1990, 
wages were higher  in  the more profitable enterprises  (Schaffer  1991, 43). 
While competitive theory suggests that profitability and wages should be un- 
correlated in a well-functioning market, in fact profitability and wages go to- 
gether in many Western countries, such as the United States. 
In Hungary, the interindustry coefficient of variation rose from .lo6  in 198  1 
to .I62 in 1987, then jumped to .227 in 1990. The ratio of nonmanual to man- 
ual earnings rose  13 percentage  points from  1978 to 1987; the earnings of 
small-scale private-sector producers went from 20 percent above national in- 
come per capita in  1982 to 55 percent above in 1987 (ILO 1990c, table 30); 
and income from work in the private sector rose from 6.5 percent of net income 
in 1980 to 14 percent in 1990 (Lado, Szalai, and Sziraczki 1991,60). There is 
also evidence of  sizable increases in the pay  of  managers  relative to other 
workers in state-owned firms: between 1986 and 1990, the ratio of managers’ 
pay to physical workers’ pay jumped from 1.9 to 3.0 in the food industry, from 
1.6 to 2.4 in textiles, and from 2.3 to 2.7 in  engineering (Vanyai and Viszt 
1992, table 6). In addition, earnings were higher in small than in large compa- 
nies’ and in private than in state-owned companies (Lado, Szalai, and Sziraczki 
1990,64-65).  From 1989 to 1991, over two-thirds of managers, professionals, 
and skilled workers had increases in real earnings compared to half the less 
6. The adjusted figures remove the increase in private-sector retail trade employment from re- 
ported  separations.  These  data  were  provided  by  Mark  Schaffer  from  the  Polish  Sfarisrical 
Yearbook. 
7. This is contrary to the results in virtually all other countries and may reflect the noneconomic 
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Table 8.4  Coefficients of Variation in the Interindustry Wage Structure: 
Manufacturing in the Socialized Sector, 1981-90 
1981  I984  I981  1988  1989  I990 
Hungary  10.6  14.2  16.2  20.5  21.6  22.1 
Poland  12.0  11.4  11.7  11.0  16.0 
Poland B  21.8  25. I 
Czechoslovakia  12.0  12.3  12.2  11.9  11.4 
Source: All data based on 27  industries given in  ILO Yearbook of  Lnbour Sfnfisfics  except for 
Poland B, where the data cover 23 industries from Rocznik Sfaqsqczny Hungarian wage figures 
prior  to  1988 are gross earnings before income-tax deductions,  whereas those after are net  of 
income-tax payments. Industries are three-digit SIC codes. 
skilled workers (Ferge 1991a, 12). The ratio of earnings between the top and 
the bottom decile in Hungary jumped from 5.0 to 6.0 largely “because the rich 
are getting significantly richer” (Ferge 1991a, 11). The college-high  school 
differential in Hungary in 1986 was 1.53 compared to 1.29 in Czechoslovakia 
(1988) and 1.16 in Poland (1988). 
In Czechoslovakia, the data show no rise in wage differentials by  industry, 
but public opinion seems quite favorable toward increased inequality. A 1990 
opinion poll reports that a majority answered “definitely yes” to the question 
whether differences in wages should be higher while 42 percent answered that 
it is right that really competent people should have lots of money, be it even 
millions (Stem Survey Organization, Prague, December 1990). 
8.2.3  Unemployment 
Contraction of the state-owned sector is an important step toward a market 
economy based on private ownership. If workers displaced from state jobs and 
new entrants to the job market quickly found employment in the growing pri- 
vate  sector, we  would  proclaim the  transition a roaring  success. Data  on 
private-sector employment and on unemployment show that this has not been 
the case. The private sector has not grown enough to absorb all the jobless, 
with resultant sizable rates of reported unemployment by  1991 and forecasts 
of even larger rates to come. By the end of  1991, unemployment approached 
12 percent in Poland and 7 percent in Czechoslovakia and Hungary (Boeri and 
Keese 1992, chart 3). As unemployment refers to persons who apply for bene- 
fits, however, there is ambiguity about the magnitude and cost of joblessness. 
Some of  the unemployed hold jobs in the shadow economy or are secondary 
earners in  families where others are employed. Others are located  in one- 
factory areas with little opportunity for irregular jobs. The experience of West 
European countries such as Spain in the  1980s makes it clear that rates of 
unemployment have very different implications for society depending on who 
is jobless, the social benefits paid the unemployed, and the ability of families 
to provide a private safety net, especially for the young. Through 1991, many 
East Europeans believed that many of the unemployed are working or not suf- 18  Richard B. Freeman 
fering greatly. In the fall of  1991, a Polish opinion survey asked, “If govern- 
ment spending must be reduced, which should be cut first?’ and found that 40 
percent were for reducing unemployment benefits, compared to 28 percent for 
reducing defense, 6 percent for reducing pensions, and 1 percent for reducing 
health  spending  (Guxetu Wborczu, 29 October 1991, cited  in Malinowski 
199  1).8 Polls in Czechoslovakia support the proposition that “unnecessary jobs 
should be reduced, even at the price of unemployment.”’ The vast majority of 
Poles surveyed viewed unemployment as too high, but 29 percent regarded it 
as a normal part of the market; 38 percent said that it should be fought, but not 
at any cost, compared to 29 percent who viewed it as impermissible. In Hun- 
gary, where one-third or so of work occurs in the  shadow economy  (Lado, 
Szalai, Sziraczki 1991, 18), a key issue is whether the unemployed obtain work 
there or whether they lose shadow economy opportunities that are associated 
with regular jobs because their regular job puts them into contact with potential 
shadow economy employers or clients. 
8.2.4  Real Earnings and Living Standards 
Measures of real earnings based on official wage and price statistics in the 
marketizing economies are likely to overstate income losses during the transi- 
tion. Price indices fail to adjust for the shortages of goods under communism, 
the queuing for goods that reached shops, and the poor quality of goods. Wage 
figures fail to take account of  earnings from the second or shadow economy. 
In Hungary, three-quarters of families had additional income from the second 
economy, and more than one-third of working time was allotted to jobs in that 
sector. According to Lado, Szalai, and Sziraczki, “The capacity of the second 
economy turned out to be sufficient to preserve previous  standards of living 
even amid the worsening conditions of the 1980s” (1991, 6). In Poland, mea- 
sured real wages in the final days of the Communist regime rose sharply, con- 
trary to actual changes in living standards. During transition, GNP may have 
been as much as 10-15  percent higher on inclusion of second economy output. 
Still, no one would argue that the transition has been “smooth sailing” on the 
income front. Ferge (1991a) reports that the proportion of the Hungarians re- 
garding themselves as poor or having difficulty managing their household bud- 
get rose markedly  between  1987 and  1990. Berg and Sachs (1992) estimate 
that consumption in Poland fell by 7 percent during the initial phase of transi- 
tion.  Projections  suggest continued  economic troubles for some time in  all 
three countries, which raises the question as to what form of  labor relations 
8. The responses are not due to the particular wording of the question. Asked which form of 
spending should be increased, 3 percent replied unemployment benefits, 3 percent defense,  17 
percent health, and 21 percent pensions. 
9. These polls are for June and December 1991, as reported by the Institute of Sociology of the 
Czech Academy of Sciences. The sociologist Siklova warned that “people [have] the feeling that 
the state and old civil servants are responsible for a citizen’s having or not having a job [whereas] 
. . . unemployment is first of all evidence of their own incapacity” (1991, 2). 19  What Direction for Labor Market Institutions? 
system might  serve them  best during the costly transition,  to which  I turn 
next.I0 
8.3  Designing a Labor Relations System for the Transition 
In  a fully developed capitalist economy, a labor relations system has three 
functions: to determine wages and working conditions through market forces 
or collective bargaining; to give workers a “voice” in the internal decision mak- 
ing of enterprises; and to provide a countervailing force to capital interests in 
the political system. The tasks for labor relations during the transition from a 
Communist to a market-driven economy are more complex and difficult. Labor 
institutions must remove the legacies of Communist labor relations described 
in section 8.1 (narrow wage distributions, reliance on the enterprise for com- 
modities,  low  productivity  and  effort,  politically  chosen  management,  and 
moribund trade unions) and help create capitalist markets.” At the same time, 
those institutions must induce workers to accept the short-term costs of transi- 
tion and guarantee that they share in future benefits. Trade unions also should 
protect members against management or government policies that may place 
excessive burdens on workers during transition. 
The ability of labor institutions, particularly unions, to promote market re- 
forms and convince workers to accept transitional costs while protecting them 
from the excesses  of  incipient capitalism  and dying state firms will have a 
profound effect on the success of transition programs. In this section, I develop 
a general framework for analyzing how  different labor arrangements might 
best carry out these important functions. My analysis is broad rather than spe- 
cific, as economics does not have sufficiently compelling theory or empirical 
knowledge to answer questions about the institutional design of advanced capi- 
talist economies,’* much less of economies in transition. To keep from being 
overly abstract, I use the model to comment on the labor relations develop- 
ments described in sections 8.1 and 8.2. 
8.3.1  Costs of Transition and Worker Attitudes 
Consider  an economy  that moves from a command  system with a com- 
pressed wage  distribution  to a market-driven  system with  greater wage  in- 
equality. For simplicity, assume that, prior to transition, all workers  earn a 
10. Why the transition has been so costly in terms of falling output is an interesting question 
that goes beyond the scope of  this study. 
11. The Russian miners’ union has stated, “We need to struggle for real businessmen to appear 
in our economy. And then or rather simultaneously to fight with these businessmen for real wages 
and worthy labour conditions” (cited in Gordon 1992b. 4). This parallels statements by Solidar- 
nosc and LIGA. 
12. Assessing the future of labor relations in marketizing economies would be much easier if 
there were a single recognized “best” set of labor institutions associated with market economies. 
But advanced OECD countries exhibit a wide spectrum of labor arrangements, which produce 
differing macroeconomic outcomes over time, all of which are basically “workable.” 20  Richard B. Freeman 
numeraire 0 and are employed by  the state. A minority benefit  immediately 
from the change in regimes (entrepreneurs, employees in private enterprises, 
the highly skilled). These “winners” obtain W >  0 after the reforms. The ma- 
jority (losers) lose L through  falling real wages or unemployment.  Think of 
them as state employees, workers in heavy industry, the unskilled. Eventually, 
they will benefit from the change in regimes by moving into the winning group, 
but in the initial phase of transition their living standards fall. If p is the proba- 
bility that a worker moves from the losing to the winning group at every time 
period  and winning  is an  absorbing Markov  state, the expected value of  a 
worker’s wage income during the first year of the reform is 
(1) 
Similarly, the value of a worker’s wage income in the second year is 
pw  -  (1 -  p)L. 
where p(  1 -  p) is the proportion of first-period losers who moved to the win- 
ning group in the second period and (1 -  p)’  is the proportion who remain in 
the losing group. 
The expected value of a worker’s income in year t is 
As t grows, an increasing proportion of workers are in the winning group SO 
that the workers’ annual (nondiscounted) expected income approaches W 
The continuous-time analogue of this expression from year 0 to t  is 
(3‘)  W -  (W + L)(exp -  pt). 
Since transition is costly, (3) is negative in early periods: at t = 0, expression 
(3)  is -L.  As time proceeds, however, more people become winners, and the 
gain  approaches  W  With  interest  rate  6 the  present  value  of  the  regime 
change is 
(4)  W  (exp -  rt) -  (W + L)  (exp -  rt -  pt) =  1  lot 
@W -  rL)/r(r + p), 
which must be positive for the change in regimes to be worthwhile. Here I 
assume infinite life solely for convenience and use different values of r to allow 
for the effects of differing years of work on (4). My assumption that all workers 
end in the winning group with wage W is also for convenience; allowing for 
differences in productivity among workers need not affect the argument. 
Present-value formula (4) provides a useful framework for considering the 
benefits  and costs of the new economic program.  Since older workers have 
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will benefit less from reforms and thus be more opposed to the change than 
younger workers. This is, I believe, in accord with the observation that younger 
workers are more favorably inclined toward market reforms in Eastern Europe 
than older workers. More interesting, W and L enter (4) in  such a way  that 
even workers who initially lose from the transition may prefer more to lesser 
inequality of earnings (W -  L).  Losers will prefer a program that raises W by 
one unit to one that reduces the loss L by  one unit  whenever p >  r. Why? 
Because they foresee high chances of becoming a winner and benefiting more 
from high W than from lower L. This is a variant of Hirschman’s (1  973) “tunnel 
effect,” according to which people left behind  in the early phase of a growth 
spurt tolerate their falling relative position  if  they believe that increases for 
others are a signal that growth will spill over to them. The analogy  is with 
drivers in a stalled lane in a tunnel, who are happy when another lane moves 
because they think this means their lane will move soon also. 
Most important, the model generates a distinct time pattern of changing sup- 
port for reforms in afixed population. Initially, everyone supports the transition 
because it has positive expected value. In period  1, there are p  winners and 
1 -  p losers. The winners are happy with the program, but the expected bene- 
fits to losers fall owing to the reduced years for reaping benefits. In period 2, 
there are p + p( 1 -  p) winners and (1 -  p)? losers, whose benefits fall further. 
At  some period  7: the present value becomes negative for losers, who turn 
against the new regime, potentially producing massive opposition. Since  p per- 
cent of the losers gain from the reforms in T (and succeeding years), however, 
overall support in the population bottoms out and rises thereafter. The result is 
a U-shaped “support curve” in which support falls (given some heterogeneity, 
the fall will be gradual) as winners and losers sort themselves out during transi- 
tion, then rises as the benefits of the market economy reach the entire popula- 
tion (see fig. 8.1). The key period for the transition  is at the bottom point of 
the support curve. If 50 percent or more turn against the program then, a demo- 
cratic  government  might  back  away  from  a  valid  transition  program-al- 
though, if it “stayed the course,” support would rise. 
The analysis is more complex when we allow for a population that changes, 
as new cohorts enter and older cohorts leave the work force. By assumption, 
new entrants expect to gain from reforms and thus add additional supporters 
of reforms to the group. As all the new entrants will be pro-reform while some 
older retiring workers will be against reform, there will be an upward tilt to 
the support curve. Thus, there are two forces at work affecting the aggregate 
proportion  supporting  reforms:  the  U-shaped  curve of  support  for existing 
workers and the upward tilt due to the influx of new workers. If the vast major- 
ity of workers are in the group experiencing the U-shaped decline, the aggre- 
gate relation  will still evince a U shape. But, if  the groups are more evenly 
balanced, there may be no U shape in the aggregate.I3 
13. This can be seen in a three-period overlapping-generations model, in which the three cohorts 
are indexed by i. where i = 1 is the oldest cohort, i = 2 is the next oldest, and so on. The probabil- 22  Richard B. Freeman 
Fig. 8.1  Changes in the proportion of support for reforms 
It is unlikely, however, that the costs of transition fall evenly on all cohorts. 
As pensioners seem to be major losers in marketizing economies, it is possible 
that even workers in the winning group may, on leaving the work force, oppose 
continued or further reforms if they see them as endangering payment of social 
security or pensions. If, moreover, costs of transition are concentrated among 
the young, as may also be the case, their attitudes toward reforms may not be 
accurately captured by  the simple assumption that they uniformly favor re- 
forms. All of this implies that additional information and analysis is needed to 
lay out the situations in which the U-shaped pattern that follows simply for a 
single cohort is also found in the aggregate. 
8.3.2  Updating Expectations 
The danger that a population will erroneously reject reforms during the tran- 
sition process grows when we consider the way  in which people may  form 
ity of getting into the winning group is .3 in each period, with the result that every cohort has a 
U-shaped support curve, with each new cohort supporting the program at rates of  100.30, and 51 
percent over time. That is, new cohorts will express  100 percent support in period  1  (since the 
present value of expected gains is positive), 30 percent support in period 2, and 51 percent support 
in period 3. But in period  1 there are two older cohorts. One possible assumption ahout them is 
that they have the same expectations as the youngest cohort. Then the following table shows the 
pattern of support over time: 
Cohort 1  Cohort 2  Cohort 3  Cohort 4  Cohort 5 
Period 1  .30  .30  1  .oo 
Period 2  .5 1  .30  1 .00 
Period 3  .5 1  .30  1 .oo 
Period 4  .5 1  .30 
Period 5  .5 1 23  What Direction for Labor Market Institutions? 
expectations about their chances of benefiting from reforms. Assume a popula- 
tion consisting of  two groups: those with a high probability of being in the 
winning group (ph),  for whom the expected return from the program is posi- 
tive, and a smaller group with a low probability (p,),  for whom the return is 
negative. Initially, each group knows that the population is so divided, and 
each has the proper expectation of its chance of gaining in the  reform^.'^ But 
individuals revise their expectations on the basis of their personal experience. 
Then, as time proceeds, losers from the high-p group may mistake bad luck 
for being a low-p person and erroneously choose to oppose the program. They 
will form erroneous expectations by updating their experiences. For instance, 
they might have the correct expectation of success of, say, p = .25 in period 1 
but revise this expectation down to, say, .20 in period 2, to .16 in period 3, and 
then erroneously oppose the ~r0gram.I~  This can readily produce a U-shaped 
support curve, as in figure 8.1, as support falls among high-p losers. The prob- 
lem is that whenever losers weigh their own  experiences more heavily than 
those of others with their same characteristics, they will understate their p and 
undervalue the program. 
Finally, there is yet another way in which a population that forms expecta- 
tions of  gaining from reforms in a highly plausible and reasonable way  can 
erroneously reject a beneficial reform program during a transitional period. 
Assume a world with a continuous distribution of unknownp’s. Again, initially 
individuals have correct priors about their chances of advancing, but they up- 
date their expectations in each period on the basis of  the proportion of  the 
population that moves into the winning group (as opposed to their personal 
experience). Note that, in this case, more high-p than low-p people will move 
into the winning group in the first period with the result that the losing group 
will consist disproportionately of  people with lower p’s. High-p losers will 
erroneously reduce their expectations of gaining from reforms over time, as 
they adjust their p’s toward the (falling) average. The result is once again an 
“erroneous” increase in the proportion of  people opposing reforms among 
those who have not yet made the transit into the winning group. 
These considerations highlight the importance of convincing losers in a tran- 
sition to a market economy that in fact they will ultimately gain from reforms. 
In a world with different types of labor, losers may oppose reform unless they 
If  the cohorts are of equal size, 53 percent of  the total population will support the program in 
period  1,60 percent in period 2, and 60 percent thereafter. Only if cohort 3 makes up the largest 
share of the population will the aggregate support curve be U shaped. 
14. An alternative model would be to assume that people do not know whether they are in the 
high- or low-probability group but have an accurate idea of the distribution of types. As  losers 
from the high-probability group update their probability of winning on the basis of their experi- 
ence, they will become increasingly confident that they are in the low-probability group. David 
Laibson has examined this model in a comment on this paper and shows that it too can give a 
U-shaped support curve (see Laibson 1992). 
15. This follows if the individual updates her prior by  the simple relation that p, = 1/(4 + t), 
where f is the number of periods in which she has failed to move into the winning group. 24  Richard B. Freeman 
see persons like themselves benefiting from transition: blue-collar workers will 
expect gains only if they see blue-collar workers with whom they identify gain- 
ing, and so on. This suggests that workers in the private (winning) sector as 
well as in the public (losing) sector be in the same union organization. Unions 
limited to losing groups in the public sector, as in the marketizing economies, 
can  endanger  reforms.  For  a  similar  reason,  support  for  reform  will  be 
strengthened if profitable enterprises  are encouraged by  policy or forced by 
collective bargaining to share economic rents with workers during the transi- 
tion to a greater extent than they might otherwise do. Why? So that there will 
be clear examples of workers who benefit from the gains. This point has been 
recognized by  pro-market unionists, who have noted that, “The union  which 
wants to be actively involved in market-oriented reforms is facing a tough chal- 
lenge. Persuading union members to adopt a different optical perspective- 
from wage demand to concerns about efficient production and market competi- 
tion-will  by no means be easy if the advantages of such a shift do not show 
up in the example of the most advanced enterprises” (Solidarno.ft  News, Sep- 
tember  1991, 3). 
The U-shaped curve of  support has a further implication for the timing of 
government safety-net programs. It suggests that expenditures be concentrated 
in periods when support bottoms out rather than being spread over time (or, 
what may  be worse, declining  over time as the fiscal costs of  interventions 
become clearer, as appears to be the case in Eastern Europe). With respect to 
specific interventions, even “bribes” or subsidies that keep alive unprofitable 
enterprises  may enhance the reform process  if they  buy additional  time for 
painful reforms or are easier to earmark for the crucial period when support is 
near its minimum level than other forms of social expenditures. Taxing winners 
and paying off losers is an obvious intervention to preserve support, but in East 
European marketizing economies many winners are in small private firms, in 
some cases in the shadow economy, which makes taxing them difficult. 
8.3.3  Collective Action 
Labor institutions can also affect the success of a transition program through 
the potential for collective action and social upheaval.  Consider what might 
happen in a marketizing economy when support for reforms falls sharply along 
the U-shaped curve of figure 8.1. Many people have lost faith because they 
have been losers. Specific groups of workers-miners,  workers in heavy indus- 
try-may  see an  opportunity  for demanding substantial  “gains”  or special 
treatment for their sector that will seriously impair the transition strategy. If 
the government continues on course, the danger to reforms is the “hot spring” 
or “angry autumn” of mass protests, strikes, etc., about which many in mar- 
ketizing economies worry, or the coups that have plagued Latin America. Such 
collective action can become a self-fulfilling prophecy of failure: if people had 
greater tolerance for the costs of transition, the program would  work, but if 
losers are sufficiently aggrieved to protest, the program may fail. Alternatively, 25  What Direction for Labor Market Institutions? 
the government may decide to back away from its reform program. The danger 
that collective actions based on short-term costs could overturn or destroy  a 
reform program argues for labor arrangements that make broad collective ac- 
tion difficult in the transition  period and thus for policies that restrict union 
activity or powers  in ways that would be undesirable in a fully functioning 
capitalist system. 
A fragmented or divided union movement, of the type found in most mar- 
ketizing economies, offers one institutional model for reducing the threat of 
collective action. In Poland, if  OPZZ organizes protests against a transition 
program, SolidarnoSC may sit on its hands, and vice versa. Or both unions may 
accept the logic of certain reforms, while informal groups of workers do not. 
But, lacking wide support, the informal groups will be unable to force changes 
in policy. Unions with a legacy of Communist leadership, like MSZOZ in Hun- 
gary, may  be able to organize protests, but  many citizens will distrust their 
activities.  And  so on. But fragmentation based in part on the persistence of 
successor  unions  is not  without  its problems.  The leadership  of  successor 
unions could manipulate discontent in ways inimical to the reform program. A 
labor  system  that  encourages  enterprise-level  unionism  or  democratically 
elected workers’ councils and discourages wider union groupings might be a 
more desirable way to reduce the risk of mass collective action. 
Finally, there are examples of suppression of free trade unions-Korea,  Sin- 
gapore, Taiwan, Franco’s Spain, Pinochet’s Chile-accompanied  by economic 
growth to make a strategy  of  suppression attractive  to some with  a limited 
commitment to democratic rights. If a 1960s-  1970s Korean-style authoritarian 
labor relations  system and dictatorship could guarantee a 6-8  percent annual 
growth of real wages to Eastern Europe for two decades, many in the marketiz- 
ing economies would readily sign on. But comparisons of the economic suc- 
cess of dictatorships (which invariably  suppress unions) and democratic re- 
gimes in developing countries show that suppression is neither sufficient nor 
necessary for successful stabilization or economic growth (World Bank 1991, 
chap. 7). And who wants General X or Colonel Z running the show if he cannot 
guarantee growth? East European tolerance for such regimes after the failure 
of Communist dictatorships may be quite low. 
8.3.4  Collective Voice and Labor Input into Transition 
If reforming governments had reliable blueprints for the transition and acted 
solely in the “public interest,” one could support a labor relations system based 
on weak institutions for the transition period. However, no one-not  even eco- 
nomic experts-knows  for certain the correct road to a market economy, and 
no government, however well intentioned, is immune to the aggrandizement of 
some groups at the expense of  the rest of society. Even the best constructed 
stabilization and transition  programs can, and do, go wrong.  Inflation  costs 
may be higher than expected. Unemployment and output losses may be bigger. 
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the uncertainty about the blueprint, and the more removed officials and experts 
are from the lives of the citizenry, the greater is the need for labor institutions 
to provide feedback about the real effects of programs and to pressure politi- 
cians to change the cost or benefit structure of those programs. 
The most efficacious labor relations system for carrying out this voicelpres- 
sure function would be an all-encompassing union confederation with the re- 
sources to assess and criticize transitional programs and the incentive to inter- 
nalize distortionary costs in favor of  a broad national economic perspective. 
On the information side, such a union body would provide a reality check on 
government programs that may be sorely needed by technocrats and politicians 
attuned to the world financial  community.  Had Poland’s advocates of rapid 
privatization developed plans with greater attention to workers’ council power 
at local  workplaces, the pace of  privatization  might have been much faster 
(Federowicz and Levitas 1994). A strong union movement would also provide 
workers who lose during transition with an institutional mechanism for carving 
out a share of gains in the future through “tripartite pacts” or centralized wage- 
setting arrangements. The inefficiency  losses due to union  monopoly power 
stressed by economists may be of second-order importance if that power prom- 
ises labor a share of the future and thus  “buys”  support during the critical 
transition. Explicit profit sharing or distribution of  stock to workers in firms 
undergoing privatization or of national bonds can also offer losers options to 
benefit from the future gains of reforms. 
Centralized labor relations  systems are not,  however, easy to institute or 
maintain, as the decentralization of  bargaining in  Sweden shows. The labor 
movement must be strong and unified. It must have the credibility to vouch for 
reform programs to workers and the strength to win gains or transfers for los- 
ing members,  particularly  those  who may  suffer for long periods  of  time. 
Czechoslovakia and Hungary have tripartite councils designed in part to cen- 
tralize labor relations, but the union movements in both countries would have 
to be much  stronger and, in the case of  Hungary, less divided for a genuine 
social pact to emerge. The division between OPZZ and SolidarnoSC makes it 
unlikely that Poland could develop along these lines. Finally, note that a strong 
centralized labor organization would have the potential for massive collective 
action, which contravenes the desire to minimize the chances of  such action 
against a valid transition program. 
8.4  Conclusion 
The preceding analysis has described the evolution of labor relations institu- 
tions and outcomes during the initial phase of marketization in Poland, Hun- 
gary, and Czechoslovakia and developed a model of changing support for re- 
forms  during  the  transition  to  a  market  economy.  The  examination  of 
institutions and outcomes has revealed surprising stability in labor institutions 
in the first stage of  transition  to a market economy but dramatic changes in 
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union  scene. Central governments taxed  wage increases  so that enterprises 
would not give increases that matched or exceeded inflation, enacted minimum 
wage legislation, and instituted tripartite forums to seek consensus on labor 
issues-as  they had done under reform communism. By contrast, labor market 
outcomes changed greatly. State-owned enterprises reduced employment even 
absent privatization, producing sizable joblessness and eliminating massive va- 
cancies. The dispersion of wages increased substantially in Hungary and Po- 
land, although not in Czechoslovakia. 
The model of changing support for reforms predicts a U-shaped curve of 
support for a successful reform program, with support falling among those 
who fail to advance rapidly in the new economic environment. It has shown 
that such a pattern is likely under a range of “reasonable” assumptions about 
the gains from reforms and individual expectations of those gains. Given this 
pattern, I examined three criteria for assessing labor arrangements in marketiz- 
ing economies: whether they increase workers’ tolerance for the costs of transi- 
tion, whether they are conducive to organizing mass protests by  those who 
suffer from transition, and whether they provide information flows to govern- 
ments about program failures and pressure governments about potentially valu- 
able changes in the direction of programs through worker “voice.” 
While a system of tripartite agreements that creates a social consensus dur- 
ing transition has the greatest appeal for dealing with the problems of transi- 
tion, my examination of the development of labor relations institutions in the 
marketizing  economies suggests a very different  outcome:  weak  and frag- 
mented unionism, concentrated in the public sector, and little or no unionism 
in the growing private sector, save in large joint ventures. This will minimize 
the probability of  mass protests but is unlikely to increase tolerance for the 
costs of transition (so that other government policies may be needed to keep 
enough popular support) and is unlikely to provide the optimal information 
flow or voice to the political system that might lead to more realistic and suc- 
cessful marketizing strategies. 
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Comment  Fabrizio Coricelli 
The paper deals with a central issue for economies in transition, namely, how 
labor market institutions can support or  jeopardize sustainable market reforms. 30  Richard B. Freeman 
After reviewing the behavior of labor market institutions and labor market vari- 
ables during the initial phase of transition in three countries-Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary, and Poland-Freeman  discusses the role of labor market institutions 
in ensuring support for reforms. 
As to the behavior of labor market institutions and variables, Freeman pres- 
ents interesting evidence pointing to institutional inertia, combined with rapid 
changes of labor market variables. There seems to be a parallel with the inertia 
of the overall political structure. While the breakdown of the old regime has 
given unprecedented powers to the new governments, there has been signifi- 
cant continuity in political institutions-the  nomenklatura is still very power- 
ful in Parliament (see Poland and Romania, e.g.); traditional trade unions are 
still very influential  (again, see Poland). While this has not proved to be an 
obstacle at the very  beginning of  the reform programs, it may  nevertheless 
prove to be a major obstacle for the sustainability  of reforms. Indeed, after a 
short initial period of “free hand” for the new governments, the old political 
institutions may be an obstacle to the creation of long-lasting political support 
for reforms. This may be particularly relevant when external shocks-like  the 
collapse  of  the  CMEA (Council  for Mutual  Economic  Assistance)-occur 
after the launch of reform programs and sharply increase the costs of transition 
(for a discussion of this aspect in the case of Poland, see Johnson and Kowal- 
ska [  19921). 
To summarize, while labor market institutions do not seem to have played a 
crucial role in the aftermath of  stabilization-cum-reform programs, they are 
likely to be a key factor in determining the speed of  reforms and even their 
success. Within these broad trends, however, the comparative aspect remains 
largely unexplored in the paper. While it is shown that labor market institutions 
and the behavior of labor market variables vary significantly across countries, 
there is no explicit attempt to draw some conclusions on the linkages between 
labor market institutions and performance of the labor market. 
Freeman suggests important institutional reforms-related  to the structure 
of bargaining, the structure of trade unions, and rules for profit sharing-that 
may ensure the necessary support for the reforms. 
These suggestions arise from a simple framework that attempts to establish 
precise criteria for judging labor market institutions during the transition. The 
framework is interesting. It is based on the assumption that, while the majority 
of workers will benefit in the long run from reforms, they will lose in the short 
run. Since there is uncertainty about the distribution of these losses, ex ante 
workers will support reforms. However, once the initial results are revealed, 
the majority  may turn  against reform.’ Poland  is a case in .point: the initial 
strong support evaporated slowly, and, by mid-1991, the majority seemed to 
1. That uncertainty on  the distribution of  losses across individuals may  create a reversal of 
the support to a reform program has been shown for the case of trade reform by  Fernandez and 
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be against the program (see opinion polls reported in Johnson and Kowalska 
[1992]). According to Freeman, this might have been caused by  workers at- 
taching too much weight to their own experience and not to the experience of 
workers successfully concluding the transition to the winning group (e.g., the 
private sector). Here the paper may be weighing too much the role of Hirsch- 
man’s “tunnel effect” and neglecting the possibility of congestion effects. In- 
deed, the transition probability for each worker may decline as the number of 
workers trying to move to the winning group increases. An important issue is 
therefore that of balancing the rate of absorption, or creation of jobs, in the 
private sector with the rate of destruction of jobs in state-owned enterprises. 
This naturally raises the issue of the speed of reforms, which is not touched on 
by the paper. A big bang approach, like the one followed by Poland, may create 
the sort of congestion described above. In contrast, a more gradual approach 
may push workers in a staggered manner into the race to the winning group. 
This implies  that state-owned  firms reduce output  and release  employment 
more gradually. The process may involve a less traumatic shock to state enter- 
prises initially, through a supporting fiscal policy and/or a more accommoda- 
tive credit policy. Note that ex post it is not obvious that this more gradual 
approach is more costly in terms of fiscal balance than a big bang approach.2 
Production inefficiencies may be larger. However, these have to be weighed 
against an increased credibility and support for the overall reform program. 
This is perhaps the central dilemma, entailing the choice of the overall stance 
of macroeconomic policies. The role of labor market institutions stressed in 
the paper may be of secondary importance in the short run. Nevertheless, the 
role of  examples of successful transitions remains important. Important as well 
are mechanisms, such as the distribution of  shares in firms undergoing priva- 
tization, that may front-load future benefits. It seems that increasing worker 
participation through distribution of  shares up front and the use of  revenues 
from privatization for social safety nets are the best options to “invest in politi- 
cal support.” 
To conclude the discussion of  the model on the cost of  transition and the 
support for reform, I would raise a note of caution on the use of models that 
take the variables determining the losing and winning positions  (wages and 
unemployment) as exogenous. Indeed, some of the policy recommendations, 
which seem appropriate to ensure the necessary support of the workers, may 
be  highly  undesirable  if  one takes  into account  that  these  measures  affect 
wages and unemployment, the variables determining the degree of support for 
the reforms. 
The paper concludes by discussing the issues of collective action and collec- 
tive voice. One puzzle that remains unanswered is the fact that, despite large 
shocks to wages, unemployment,  and living  standards, which, according to 
2. Dewatripont and Roland (1991) actually  argue that  the fiscal costs of  gradualism are far 
smaller than those of the big bang. 32  Richard B. Freeman 
Freeman, have thrown, at least for the moment, the majority of workers into 
his loser category, no significant episodes of labor unrest have arisen. 
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Comment  Anthony Levitas 
Richard Freeman’s paper first summarizes labor relations under communism. 
Freeman argues that since 1989 there has been relatively  little change in the 
institutions that regulate labor markets in Eastern Europe: wages are still cen- 
trally controlled; the old Communist unions have proved surprisingly strong; 
the new unions remain relatively  weak; and little attempt has been  made to 
integrate organized labor into the reform process as a whole. He then goes on 
to show that, while labor market institutions have proved remarkably stable, 
there has been rapid and dramatic change in labor markets: unemployment has 
risen dramatically; real wages have fallen; and wage differentials are increas- 
ing. Finally, he reflects  on the implications  of  this gap between  the rate of 
institutional change and the rate of change taking place on labor markets. 
Unlike many others, Freeman  argues that this gap poses severe problems 
for the long-term viability of reform. On the one hand, he points out that the 
persistence of the gap may incline short-term losers to unravel sound economic 
policies through mass protest. On the other hand, he suggests that it may also 
permit unsound economic policies to go  unchanged until the population rebels. 
Disturbed by both possibilities, Freeman proposes three criteria by which we 
might judge the contemporary institutional efforts to reform labor markets in 
Eastern and Central Europe: Do these reforms increase the tolerance of work- 
ers for the costs of transition? Do they give workers sufficient voice to inform 
governments that their policies are pushing people past the breaking point? Do 
they help facilitate intolerance by making it too easy for “voice” to become 
mass protest? 
Using these criteria, Freeman then outlines four developmental possibilities. 
The first gives workers too much voice, leading to Peronism and the slow death 
of market reforms. The second suppresses labor’s voice now, in the name of  an 
economic success that, as Freeman takes pains to point out, may or may not 
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making it possible for reform to muddle on, but sufficiently distorting people’s 
voices so that feedback to the state is unclear and the threat of explosion re- 
mains ever present. The fourth calls for nurturing unions responsible enough 
to negotiate the balance between current costs and future gains with the state 
while strong enough to compel their members to accept the fruits of these ne- 
gotiations. 
Normatively speaking, Freeman hopes that this last strategy will be pursued, 
although he concludes by saying that he would be “mad” either to predict out- 
comes or to recommend particular solutions. Thus, while it is hard not to sym- 
pathize with Freeman’s intent, it is also hard not to feel a little shortchanged by 
the open-endedness of  his conclusions. Indeed, I think that the language of 
voice and tolerance that Freeman uses to set up the problem of institutional 
reform, and to justify it as a political  project worthy of an economist, does 
more to confuse the  issues than resolve  them. On the one hand, it tends- 
despite disclaimers-to  reduce the problem of reforming labor market institu- 
tions to a problem of either convincing short-term losers to bide their time or 
providing the government with feedback mechanisms so that it will know when 
its time is running short. On the other hand, it does not provide us with the 
conceptual tools necessary to distinguish between the responsible neocorporat- 
ism that Freeman desires and the Peronism that he fears. 
In short, the economic problem presented by labor market reform is not 
really  about  improving  either  workers’  or the  state’s perception  of  things. 
Rather, it is about recasting institutions so that they might provide people with 
better opportunities to improve their life chances on the market. Moreover, the 
question is not just about arriving at some macroeconomic modus vivendi with 
organized labor-although  this would be nice-but  of creating a framework 
for a microeconomic modus operandi in which organized labor has an institu- 
tional role. 
Indeed, it is seems to me that only by  enlisting organized labor in local, 
institutional efforts to improve people’s life chances could either the pressure 
for or the temptation of Peronist macroeconomic policies be decreased. And, 
while I agree with Freeman that there are no generalizable blueprints for such 
a scheme, I think that we can go farther in specifying the principles on which 
such an attempt might be made. First, unions ought to be institutionally sup- 
ported since without them there is no way of actively enlisting labor in reform 
efforts. This support, however, should be focused at the local level, both by 
giving unions control over new resources (such as the disbursement of unem- 
ployment checks) and by requiring them to take part in the joint administration 
of  active manpower programs.  Second, more resources must be invested in 
creating such programs. This means founding training institutes, redeploying 
and reforming existing educational facilities, and providing start-up capital to 
new enterprises. 
Third, and most important, the institutions responsible for these programs 
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business  representatives.  Local unions,  in other  words,  not  only  should  be 
forced to confront the problems of marketization but should also be given an 
institutional stake in and a responsibility for finding solutions. Fourth, unions 
should be encouraged to support privatization by using a percentage  of  the 
proceeds  to create development  funds at least partially  controlled  by  union 
locals. Finally, unions should be enlisted in the effort to restructure the region’s 
industrial dinosaurs.  So far these efforts have been painfully  slow, not only 
because governhents have been reluctant to negotiate plant reform or closings 
with labor, but also because governments have been naively hoping that the 
market would resolve these problems for them. 
Discussion Summary 
Tom Kolaja disagreed with the conventional  wisdom that individual success 
stories encourage workers to have confidence in the reform process. He said 
that jealousy was the overriding sentiment, adding that Poles tend to believe 
that corruption  is behind most success stories. He cited the case of ABB, a 
Western company that purchased a Polish turbine plant. This joint venture was 
extremely successful until envious workers in an associated state-owned enter- 
prise effectively sabotaged the new company. 
Kolaja also discussed the development of a work ethic in Poland. He noted 
that, in Warsaw, a number  of all-night stores that pay relatively  high wages 
have had difficulty finding people to staff the night shift. He said that workers 
need to be convinced that it is worth working hard to get better pay. 
Simon Johnson criticized the timing of the Polish reform program. He said 
that, at the beginning of the liberalization, workers and unions showed amaz- 
ingly high support for radical  change. At that point,  nobody knew who the 
winners and losers would  be. Six to nine months later, individual outcomes 
became much clearer, stratification occurred, and reform fatigue syndrome set 
in. However, some of the reforms were postponed until this time. Johnson felt 
that more of the reforms should have been implemented when there was still 
very high initial popularity. 
Pentti  Kouri provided  several anecdotes about  production  techniques  in 
Eastern Europe and Russia. He emphasized that these countries have plenty of 
skilled labor but a devastating lack of efficient production techniques. The av- 
erage wage in Russia is $16.00 per month, but Russian industry still cannot 
compete. He cited the example of Russia’s main car manufacturer, where an 
assembly line set up by Henry Ford is still in use. 
Richard Luyard noted that, even though there has been little change in the 
structure of labor market institutions, there has been a dramatic change in the 
way those old institutions function. For example, wages used to be set at a 
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importance of preventing the leapfrogging practices associated with decentral- 
ized wage bargaining. 
Jan  Winiecki warned  that it is unrealistic to rely on the emerging private 
sector to generate enough “winners” to make the reforms popular. If workers 
rely exclusively on the private sector, they will have to wait a very long time. 
Winiecki proposed that the government mollify workers by giving them con- 
trol rights over state-owned firms andor promising them some of the (future) 
privatization revenues. 
Richard Freeman agreed with Levitas’s suggestions about extending the do- 
main of union activity. Freeman added an extra task: the management of pen- 
sion funds. In the United States, union-managed pension funds own 15 percent 
of  U.S. equities. Freeman warned, however, that unions would require some 
technical assistance and Western aid to develop the required expertise to under- 
take all the new activities that he and Levitas had proposed. 
Freeman concluded by questioning whether it was appropriate to try to de- 
velop a stronger work ethic in Eastern Europe. He was not bothered by the fact 
that Polish workers did not want to work late at night. He said that Western 
economists should not force everyone to look like Americans. This Page Intentionally Left Blank